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ABSTRACT
The unit of analysis for this thesis is the restructuring of 
organization. Restructuring is examined with respect to a structural 
theory and taxonomy of forms of human association in disaster. The 
taxonomy points to four elements as discrete dimensions of structure. 
Domains(D) and tasks(T) are interpreted as ends of organization: their
restructuring empirically grounds substantive rationality. Resources(R) 
and activities(A) are interpreted as means of organization: their
restructuring empirically grounds administrative rationality. Case 
materials on emergency responses following a tornado describe 57 
restructurings by 22 social units over an 18 month period. A logical 
metric describes the form of restructuring as falling on a continuum of 
administrative to substantive rationality. The thesis also emphasizes 
the analytical importance and distinctiveness of temporal and spatial 
characteristics of restructuring.
The findings indicate that there are alternative but not an 
unlimited number of ways in which restructuring can take place. The 
findings also suggest that there is a paradoxical relationship between 
administrative and substantive rationality. Each is telling strength 
and weakness of organization. A balance between them enhances 
efficiency and effectiveness of response. Finally, the findings show 
that the order, timing, location, and dispersion of multiple 
restructurings by the same unit are related in numerous ways that can be 
calibrated.
DISASTER AND THE RESTRUCTURING 
OF ORGANIZATION
INTRODUCTION
Structure itself is revealed in society's becoming and one can 
only illuminate it on condition of not losing sight of this 
process of becoming. It (social structure) is constantly 
becoming and changing (forming and breaking down); it is life 
having crystallized to a degree; and to distinguish it from 
the life from which it derives or the life that determines it 
amounts to dissociating inseparable things. (Durkheim, 1900 
in Wilson, 1981, pp 1060)
The analytical status of social structure prompts one of the most 
venerable debates within sociology (Grafstein, 1982: Mayhew, 1982).
For those who assume it, structure defies simple interpretation. At the 
same time its reality is, in the Durkheimian sense, a matter of 
"becoming and changing" (Wilson, 1981:1060). The focus of this thesis 
is not specifically on the process of becoming, but rather on the 
dynamics of changing or restructuring. Despite the often heated debates 
about the existence of structure, the matter of its restructuring is as 
complex as the idea of structure itself.
If structure exists, is it a thing or process? In either case, how 
does structure change? Is restructuring a form of collective behavior 
or does it reflect formal rationality? Is restructuring driven by the 
human actor, or is the actor constrained by the unit in which 
restructuring takes place? Precisely how does restructuring occur? Can 
restructuring be spatially or temporally bounded? All of these 
questions are relevant to this thesis. The major task is to capture the 
dynamics of restructuring at the empirical level. This is done by 
extending Kreps' organizational theory (1978;1983;
1984;1985a;1985b;1986) through reanalyses of archival data on the
2
3delivery of mental health services following a tornado. Just as with 
Kreps' earlier work on some 15 natural disasters in the United States, 
the archival data on this event was developed from earlier studies by 
the Disaster Research Center (Taylor, Ross, and Quarantelli, 1976).
A SUBSTANTIVE BASE: KREPS' THEORY AND TAXONOMY
Kreps focuses on structure and process at the same time in his 
theory of organization and disaster. His work pays close attention to 
the classical writers in sociology and their puzzling about the dynamic 
and static aspects of collective life (Kreps, 1986). The result is a 
precise definition and empirical grounding of organizing patterns within 
a broader taxonomy of the forms of human association.
Kreps1 theory isolates four structural elements as individually 
necessary and collectively sufficient for organization to exist: 
domains (D), tasks (T), resources (R), and activities (A). Domains and 
tasks are interpreted as ends of organizations; resources and 
activities as its means. The elements are defined as follows:
1) Domains are collective representations of bounded units and 
their reasons for being. Expressed in and legitimated by the 
communications of direct participants and others interacting 
with them, the existence of a domain evidences social 
structure as open system of human action (Levine and White, 
1961; Thompson, 1967; Haas and Drabek, 1973).
2) Tasks are collective representations of a division of labor 
for the enactment of human activities. Tasks independently 
define the unit quality of human action by pointing to a 
closed system that is structured from within. Tasks are 
expressed in and legitimated by the communications of those 
enacting them.
43) Resources are the material technologies and subjective 
attributes of human populations. Resources are both static 
and dynamic. They are static because, as part of structure, 
their relevance is conditioned by the reality of domains and 
tasks. They are dynamic because domains and tasks are social 
constructions of human beings.
4) Activities are the conjoined actions of human populations 
which at once establish and are conditioned by social 
structure. Analytically distinct from all other elements, 
activities relate symmetrically with structure and its 
interpretation as unit and process.
It must be emphasized that each of the four elements is uniquely 
important for a processual approach to structure. Thus, neither ends 
(D, T) nor means (R, A) has analytical primacy. Certainly D, T, R, and 
A are all grounded in the human actor, as reality and creator of social 
structure. However, each element is grounded equally in the social
unit, as reality and constraining force. While the elements need not be
arranged in any particular sequence, their mutual co-presence, as 
organization, enhances the possibility for consideration of its 
restructuring. In developing a precise definition of organization as 
ongoing process, Kreps provides new directions for empirical studies of 
organizing.
Central to his approach, Kreps (1985) highlights three system 
states of organization (Dubin, 1978): origins, maintenance, and
suspension. In defining origins, the crescive nature of organization is
emphasized. Organization is in a state of becoming. Specifically, each
element comes into play individually as one of four stages of origins 
(1, 2, 3, and 4 elements present; e.g., A, A-R, A-R-D, A-R-D-T). Table 
1 presents all logically possible arrangements among the four elements 
of organization. As entity, organization is represented by the mutual
5Table 1: Taxonomy of the 64
Forms of Association
One Two Three Four
Element Element Element Element
Forms Forms Forms Forms
D D-T D-T-R D-T-R-A
T D-R D-T-A D-T-A-R
R D-A D-R-A D-R-A-T
A T-R D-R-T D-R-T-A
T-A D-A-T D-A-T-R
T-D D-A-R D-A-R-T
R-A T-R-A T-R-A-D
R-D T-R-D T-R-D-A
R-T T-A-D T-A-D-R
A-D T-A-R T-A-R-D
A-T T-D-R T-D-R-A
A-R T-D-A T-D-A-R
R-A-D R-A-D-T
R-A-T R-A-T-D
R-D-T R-D-T-A
R-D-A R-D-A-T
R-T-D R-T-D-A
R-T-A R-T-A-D
A-D-T A-D-T-R
A-D-R A-D-R-T
A-T-D A-T-D-R
A-T-R A-T-R-D
A-R-D A-R-D-T
A-R-T A-R-T-D
4 12 24 24
Total Forms of Association = 64
6co-presence of all four elements. Thus, it is only by specifying 
patterns of emergence of the elements that origins can be revealed.
In his earlier work, Kreps (1985) concentrates on the origins of 
organization, using the disaster event as catalyst for describing how 
organization comes into being. The following are illustrations of the 
process that is described. They are two of 423 instances of 
organization from 15 natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, tornados, 
hurricanes) that Kreps has located from the archives of the Disaster 
Research Center (DRC).
Four Element Form: A-R-D-T
Flood waters rise over a period of days in the community 
and are monitored. Flooding eventually covers much of an 
urban area and virtually the entire downtown of its major 
city. There are few deaths or injuries but extensive property 
damage. Major flood conditions prevail for over a week. The 
police department initially is involved in traffic control 
during the emergency period, but that action terminates with 
the complete inundation of central city streets. Several 
citizens with boats docked in the downtown area conjointly 
begin evacuating people from buildings. Their preliminary 
actions are independent of anything being done by the police 
department. In fact, police officials note that, at this 
point, they are looking for something to do. There has been 
no preplanning for what follows. Having a few boats of their 
own, the police coordinate their evacuation actions with those 
of private citizens (A). The need to evacuate the entire 
downtown area quickly becomes apparent. A large number of 
boats from other private owners, the bureau of land 
management, the fire department, and the military are 
provided. The latter public bureaucracies also offer 
personnel to drive some of the boats, and some citizen 
volunteers respond to the same need. By now, the majority of 
police personnel have become involved because they are 
available, in close proximity, and know where to take evacuees 
(R). The following morning, local government leaders declare 
the downtown evacuation as the responsibility of the police 
department (D). This is questioned briefly but then accepted 
by fire department officials and is further legitimated by 
state and military officials. The police then quickly develop 
a rather complex task structure -- one that involves locating, 
notifying, dispatching, and refueling of boats, assigning of
police personnel to all boats, and coordinating of water and 
ground transportation to move evacuees to shelters (T). About 
5000 people are evacuated during the next 3-4 days. The 
operation is maintained by the police department until the 
demand is met (1985:10).
Four Element Form: D-R-A-T
A temporary morgue is set up after a tornado. The county 
coroner is not a doctor but a local funeral director. He has 
no coroner's office, no staff, and no morgue. Normally, he 
simply signs autopsies after they are completed by hospital 
pathologists. After the tornado, spokesmen for the only 
hospital say their staff cannot handle those killed by the 
event. A discussion by the coroner and two pathologists at 
the hospital leads to a decision to set up a temporary morgue.
The coroner requests use of the local YMCA for the morgue.
The YMCA director accedes to the request (D). The coroner, 
the two pathologists, a licensed embalmer, and a marine 
recruiter go to the YMCA. The YMCA provides several rooms and 
a couple of staff (R). Concurrently, ambulances start 
bringing bodies to the morgue; people come to the morgue 
concerned about the missing; bodies start to be identified 
(no autopsies are done and none is intended); and ministers 
who stop by or come with concerned residents start attending 
to the needs of the bereaved (A). The need for "organization" 
is expressed by the key participants. The identified and 
unidentified dead are physically seperated, with the two 
pathologists attending to them. The licensed embalmer and 
marine recruiter take on paper work tasks. The coroner 
maintains liaison with the hospital, funeral homes, and next 
of kin. Two ministers are asked to remain and attend to the 
needs of the bereaved at another location in the building (T).
The morgue closes about 24-30 hours after it opens (1985:11).
In the above illustrations, the emergence of organization is 
captured: from one (A or D), to two (A-R or D-R) to three (A-R-D or
D-R-A), and finally to four element (A-R-D-T or D-R-A-T) forms of 
association. In the first case, notice that an existing social unit 
(police department) improvises in this particular instance: the
activities (A) of individuals are pivotal initially, with major 
resources (R) being mobilized next. Legitimation is then given to the 
social action (D) and this is followed by a clearer delineation of tasks
8(T). The illustration indicates that an established unit enacts a new 
domain. But in fact, some established organizations do not act at all 
for a time following the event. And there are other instances of 
organization-- such as the second example of an emergency morgue--where 
there is no predisaster unit. While the morgue exhibits the entity 
status of organization just as well as the police department, its form 
of origins is very different.
Once again, using the disaster event as catalyst, Kreps documents 
each element as it relates to the origins of organization. Individually 
necssary and collectively sufficient conditions of organization are met 
when the last element is in place [in these examples, tasks (T)]. Only 
then does organization move to the second system state, which is termed 
the maintenance of organization. Anything that subsequently occurs, 
with respect to an instance of organizing, involves restructuring of the 
four elements until such time as organization is suspended (the absence 
of one of the elements). Referencing the above case descriptions, 
changes in the operations of the police over the next 3-4 days of the 
emergency response, or changes in the operations of the emergency morgue 
over a matter of hours can be represented as the restructuring of the 
elements.
The foci of this thesis are forms of association enacted during the 
maintenance state of organization. Where Kreps does not assume the 
existence of organization, here the existence of enacting units is taken 
as given for purposes of describing restructuring of the elements. In 
other words, what takes place following the event is described in this 
thesis as a continuing process of restructuring of elements with respect
9to each other. Thus in contrast to Kreps1 earlier work, we do not 
describe the origins of the enacting units. Rather we have assumed that 
the transition from origins to maintenance is one of logical necessity. 
From this standpoint, it makes no difference how long it takes to reach 
this system state (maintenance), nor is there a concern with the 
arrangement of the four elements prior to it. Rather, organization now 
exists and is in the process of restructuring. Capturing that 
restructuring requires (1) documenting changes in domains (D), tasks 
(T), resources (R), or activities (A) and (2) describing their 
patterning as alternative forms of association (1-4 elements present).
INSTANCE OF RESTRUCTURING AS UNIT OF ANALYSIS
As implied above, the unit of analysis for the thesis is the 
instance of restructuring: one that is spatially and temporally
bounded. Restructuring can be characterized as the variable presence of 
the four elements during some measurable period of time. Variable 
presence simply means that the elements exist but are changing in 
various ways. For example, the circumstances of disaster point to 
organizational contingencies or problems. Thus one or all of the 
elements may be restructured because new circumstances demand 
adaptation. If the contingency is resolved, organization continues 
until a new contingency arises or the final stage of organization 
(suspension) is reached. A successful ending of organization can be 
termed need met, response terminated.
Kreps (1985b:28) characterizes restructuring in this way:
10
An element related contingency arises. For example, 
transportation is disrupted because a bridge washes out 
(activities related). A piece of important equipment is 
damaged or destroyed, or participants quit because of 
exhaustion or role conflict (resources related). Plans become 
confused and it is not clear what will be done next (tasks 
related). Objectives are challenged by participants or those 
on the outside (domain related). If the contingency is 
resolved through restructuring of the elements, organization 
is sustained until the end state is reached.... or some new 
contingency appears.
Administrative and Substantive Rationality
Regardless of the catalyst for change, any restructuring of domains 
(D) and tasks (T) provides an indication of what Kreps terms substantive 
rationality. Restructuring related to resources (R) and activities (A) 
is an indicator of what he terms administrative rationality.
Substantive rationality suggests that participants are preoccupied with 
the ends of organization. That is to say, domains (D) and tasks (T), 
are being questioned or redefined as a result of social action. 
Conversely, administrative rationality suggests that participants are 
preoccupied with the means of organization. In other words, resources 
(R) and activities (A) are being restructured to meet the requirements 
of relatively fixed domains (D) and tasks (T).
While both administrative and substantive rationality are critical 
to the viability of organization, their relationship is a paradox. The 
strength of administrative rationality (e.g., a regularly updated 
disaster plan which formalizes a unit's response) is that things get 
done. Still, too much of it thwarts improvisation and the latter is 
essential when circumstances are difficult to control. The presence of 
improvisation points to substantive rationality. However, too much 
questioning of what is being done, and how, may exacerbate the physical
11
harm and social disruption resulting from the event. It also may 
undermine the credibility of the responding unit. Thus, focusing on 
either ends (substantive rationality) or means (administrative 
rationality) without involving the other, may inhibit effective 
performance in the face of altered or changing conditions. Stated 
another way, both administrative and substantive rationality are 
essential to the viability of organization and at the same time threaten 
it.
Substantive rationality points to the human actor as prime mover of 
social structure (ends oriented, actor dominated). Administrative 
rationality expresses social structure as the dynamic force which 
constrains the individual and maintains the unit (means oriented, unit 
dominated). Their relationship during maintenance is very difficult to 
capture empirically. With measurement much less precise than will be 
developed here, Kreps earlier found that the two are positively related. 
This suggests that ends (D, T) and means (R, A) based restructuring are 
part and parcel of the viability of any organization. Where the unit 
(ends) dominates what is happening, restructuring tends to be confined 
to organizational means. Action takes place but the actor is object of 
structure. Conversely, where the actor (means) dominates, ends are 
being questioned and possibly altered. Order is maintained, but the 
actor is subject of structure. The implied goal for emergency 
management is complementarity between constraining unit and 
administrative rationality on the one hand; and accomplished actor and 
substantive rationality on the other. In effect, complementarity is the 
successful integration of the ends and means of social structure.^
12
Spatial and Temporal Dynamics of Restructuring
Restructuring can also be articulated with respect to time and 
space. As Wallace (1983:134) suggests, "certain social phenomena may be 
observed virtually everywhere but only at certain times....whereas other 
social phenomena may be observed virtually everywhen but only at certain 
places." His point is that spatial and temporal dimensions are unique 
and vital for describing any social phenomenon (Collins, 1981; Wallace, 
1983). Because disasters can reasonably be demarcated as bounded 
events, they provide strategic research sites for describing the 
temporal and spatial properties of restructuring.
Wallace provides several (he deems them parallel) properties of
time and space which will be used in describing restructuring of
domains, tasks, resources, and activities. The relevant temporal
dimensions are termed (1) order, (2) timing, (3) rhythm, and (4)
periodicity of restructuring. The relevant spatial dimensions are
termed (1) location, (2) dispersion, (3) pattern, and (4) uniformity of 
2
restructuring. The first and second properties in each set will 
be used to describe all instances of restructuring. The third and 
fourth properties in each set will be used to describe the patterning of 
multiple instances of restructuring by the same unit. Each of these 
properties is briefly defined below.
With regard to temporal properties, order involves the empirical 
determination of which elements (1-4) change in any instance of 
restructuring and their sequence (see Table 1). Temporal timing is the 
elapsed time from an identified catalyst to change in the first 
appearing element, and to change in any subsequent element restructured
13
(first to second, second to third, and third to fourth). Temporal 
rhythm is then evidenced by regularity in the order of the elements 
across multiple instances of restructuring by the same unit. Similarly, 
periodicity is then evidenced by any regularity in the timing of 
elements across multiple instances of restructuring. It is important to 
distinguish between rhythm and periodicity. Thus a sequence of several 
restructurings (e.g., A-R, A-R, A-R and administrative rationality) 
could involve the same ordering of the elements (rhythm), while the time 
lags between appearance of elements could be very different 
(periodicity).
With regard to spatial properties, location is the geographic locus 
of the unit's action (in this case local or county) during any instance 
of restructuring. Spatial dispersion is evidenced by the number of 
activity sites of the unit's action during any instance of 
restructuring. Spatial pattern is then evidenced by regularity in the 
location of the unit's action across multiple instances of 
restructuring. Similarly, uniformity is then evidenced by regularity in 
dispersion of the unit's action across multiple instances of 
res true tur ing.
DISASTER EVENT AS CATALYST
Disasters are useful catalysts for examining the restructuring of 
organization (Dubin, 1978). They can readily be viewed as non-routine 
events in which a community and its sub-units are faced with unusual and 
severe circumstances. When a disaster strikes, the normal condition of
14
the community can no longer be assumed. For example, the impact of the 
disaster might be such that many existing organizations undertake 
different activities from their pre-disaster routines. In the 
Durkheimian sense, the units can be considered as becoming something 
else. But that becoming is as much derivative as it is emergent. Such 
transformations are interpreted as instances of restructuring. They are 
documented in this study by responses of mental health units following a 
tornado which struck a mid-western community.
The Event
The tornado which struck the site of the original DRC research was 
part of a regional disaster. As stated by the authors of the original 
s tudy,
At least 148 tornadoes gouged paths through more than 200 
counties in 13 states. The tornado that struck the community 
thrust it into the limelight as one of the single worst 
community disasters in the history of the United States. The 
tornado wreaked physical damage and ripped the very fabric of 
social life....at the interpersonal level, there were serious 
strains. (Taylor, Ross, Quarantelli, 1976:60)
Familial, community, business, and religious life, as well as other 
aspects of human interaction, were severely disrupted. Very few 
households in the community were left untouched, with the result that 
social bonds were profoundly affected. It was from this set of 
circumstances that the ostensible need for disaster related mental 
health services was determined. But as the process of determining the 
mental health needs of the victims of the tornado began, there was no 
clear-cut perception of what those needs might be. Indeed, there was 
general confusion among the various professionals and laypersons
15
involved about what to do. Were they dealing with problems of living or 
mental health trauma? In either case, would needs of victims be of 
short or long term duration? Over time a consensus was reached that 
mental health problems resulting from the disaster would arise most 
significantly in the long run.
The Original Study
The focus of the original study was on the delivery of mental 
health services over an 18 month period following the tornado. The 
initial reactions at the local level were somewhat mixed: from
inaction, to reaction, to action and change. That is, the first 
response of the established local mental health units (some 10 units 
providing psychological or psychiatric services) was inaction. Federal 
agencies suggested (strongly) that this was inappropriate. As a result, 
these and some 19 other local units (e.g., churches, hospitals, social 
service agencies) moved to develop a program. For all intents and 
purposes, their first attempt to provide disaster services related to 
mental health was a failure. The failure then led to the establishment 
of a new program. The new program emphasized a broad range of victim 
needs, only some of which related to traditional mental health models.
Implementation of the new program improved upon the initial 
attempt. The new system provided more timely services related to the 
disaster. It established a more identifiable area of operations and a 
different set of interactive components. What amounted to a new system 
enabled units providing services to expedite their efforts on behalf of 
disaster victims. The authors of the original study concluded that the 
established mental health system was unable to adapt to the new
16
situation while the emergent system was able to develop a more coherent 
framework within which to work. They argued that the effectiveness of 
the new system surpassed the abilities of its predecessor.
Structural Observations
While the final report from the original study provides many 
interesting observations and conclusions about the established and 
emergent mental health systems, there is an important omission from the 
standpoint of a structural perspective on organizing. Simply put, the 
existence of the old system was assumed in the original study and the 
effort was to characterize its transformation. Thus, attention was 
directed to the system as a whole rather than the manner in which units 
within it were restructured for purposes of meeting disaster demands.
The focus of the present research is restructuring of the member units. 
By using Kreps' core species concept of organizing (patterns of 
transformation of D, T, R, and A), we hope to describe how the 
restructuring of member units took place. Particular attention will be 
given to measurement of (1) administrative and substantive rationality, 
(2) time and space dimensions of organizing, and (3) characteristics of 
enacting units that shed further light on the process of restructuring.
A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO RESTRUCTURING
The data used for this research are archival material maintained by 
the Disaster Research Center (DRC) at the University of Delaware. While 
the original research was not done with Kreps' theory and this extension 
of it in mind, it does provide useful data on instances of restructuring
17
over an 18 month period following the event. Indeed, our review of the 
interviews and related case materials from the study reveals some 
fascinating accounts of what occurred as a result of the disaster.
The Data Base
The thesis focuses on 123 interviews and supporting documents 
earlier derived by DRC for the disaster event. The interviewees were 
direct participants in the established and emergent systems. The 
documents relate to unit accounts of what took place. Using this 
archival material to construct a new data file, a sample of 57 instances 
of restructuring has been developed. The 57 cases located were enacted 
by 22 social units. In all cases the description of the restructuring 
is tied to one of the 64 logical possibilities in Kreps1 earlier 
taxonomy (see Table 1: 1-4 elements of organization restructured).
This allows for a determination of the extent to which restructuring 
reflects administrative (means-based) to substantive (ends-based) 
rationality. Moreover, the various dimensions of time and space 
developed above from Wallace's work (1983) are grounded empirically.
All of this informs our attempt to describe restructuring as process. 
Finally, a variety of other structural properties of the enacting unit 
are measured as they inform description of the 57 cases.
The methodology used is both qualitative and quantitative. That 
is, measurement of restructuring is captured initially through 
qualitative descriptions of what happened, then patterning of the 
elements relevant to each restructuring is expressed quantitatively.
The strategy employed is as follows: First, a description of what
occurred at each stage of restructuring is developed from the data, with
18
particular attention paid to its formal, spatial, and temporal 
characteristics. Second, this allows (a) a determination of the extent 
to which the restructuring reflected administrative and substantive 
rationality; (b) the measurement of basic temporal (order, timing) and 
spatial (location, dispersion) variables for all cases of restructuring; 
and (c) the measurement of derived temporal (rhythm, periodicity) and 
spatial (pattern, uniformity) variables when an enacting unit had two or 
more sequential instances of restructuring. Third, other structural 
variables of the enacting units that might have influenced the process 
of restructuring are measured for purposes of enhancing description. A
more specific detailing of the major variables follows.
Administrative and Substantive Rationality
The logical measurement (base metric) found on Table 2 expands on 
Kreps' metric of the 24 organizational forms (Kreps, 1985a) by 
incorporating the remaining 40 forms of association in the taxonomy. 
While Kreps1 earlier metric was applied to the origins of organization, 
that employed in the present study is intended to capture the system 
state of maintenance. Each of the 64 forms listed on Table 1 are 
represented in this study as discrete instances of restructuring: 
represented as one, two, three or four element forms of association. As
ends of organization, changes in domains (D) and tasks (T) reference 
substantive rationality. As means of organization, changes in resources 
(R) and activities (A) reference administrative rationality.
For each case of restructuring located, a change of D or T (or 
both) is indicated by plus (+) signs. A change of R or A (or both) is
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indicated by minus (-) signs. The resulting scoring runs from a +2 
(ends predominate) to -2 (means predominate) with a mid-point of 0 
(balance or tension). For example, a T-D-R form of restructuring is 
represented by two pluses (for D and T) and one minus (for R). The 
aggregate score is +1 indicating the predominance of ends in the 
restructuring process. Conversely, an R-D-A form of restructuring 
receives two minuses (for R and A) and one plus (for D). The aggregate 
score is -1 indicating the predominance of means in this instance of 
restructuring. As an exercise in logic, then, note that all four 
element forms must yield scores of 0 (various combinations of two pluses 
and two minuses); all three element forms are either +1 (two ends and 
one means implicated) or -1 (two means and one end implicated); two 
element forms yield scores of +2 (ends only), -2 (means only), or 0 (one
of each); and one element forms have scores of +1 or -1 (one end or one
means). The result is a normal distribution of the 64 forms in Kreps' 
taxonomy.
The base metric presented on Table 2 only captures the relative 
presence of ends and means in each instance of restructuring. It is not 
sensitive to the actual number of elements implicated, nor does it 
capture their ordering (e.g., D-A versus A-D). The derived metric found 
on Table 3 builds these dimensions directly into the scoring: by
weighting the value of earliest appearing elements; and decreasing that 
weighting as each additional element comes into play. Specifically, the 
plus or minus sign for the first appearing element in any instance of
restructuring is weighted by four times. Thus a D or T receives a score
of +4 as first appearing element; and an A or R receives a score of -4
21
as first appearing element. The second appearing end (+) or mean (-) is 
weighted by 3 times (+3 or -3); the third appearing element by two 
times (+2 or -2); and the fourth appearing element is not weighted at 
all (+1 or -1).
As shown on Table 3, the result is a distribution of scores which 
reflects pure types of administrative (R-A and A-R) and substantive (D-T 
and T-D) rationality at the extremes of the distribution (+7 and -7); 
mixed types which reflect a balancing of the two forms of rationality at 
the midpoint (0); and mixed types which reflect gravitation toward 
either pole of an underlying continuum between them. Either end of that 
continuum points to the paradox of accomplished actor and dynamic unit 
in social structure. Just as with Kreps' earlier work, the metric is 
designed to merge qualitative description of the content of social 
structure, with quantitative depiction of its formal properties.
Spatial and Temporal Dynamics of Restructuring
The previously discussed temporal properties of restructuring are 
captured in the following manner. The temporal order of each case 
involves judgments (through descriptions of what happened) of which 
elements of organization were restructured (dichotomous choices) and in 
what sequence (what changed first and so on if additional elements came 
into play). Using the onset of the tornado as the starting point, 
timing is measured in days and hours with respect to when those elements 
restructured were changed. For one-element forms of restructuring, 
timing is represented by the lag between the event and the 
restructuring. If additional elements came into play, timing is
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measured by the lag between the appearance of each one (second, third, 
or fourth). A derived total time of restructuring is the lag between 
the onset of the event and the end-state of the restructuring.
For some units in the file there is sufficient data to capture 
multiple instances of restructuring. The problem here is to determine 
points of discontinuity between restructurings, such that organization 
is said (analytically) to be at rest during the interim. Points of 
temporal discontinuity and the appearance of additional catalysts for 
change provide the empirical foundation for these determinations. Such 
additional catalysts in this study are represented by a diverse range of 
subsequent contingencies (such as competitive or cooperative 
relationships with other units) and proactive changes by the enacting 
unit (such as an attempt to expand a domain).
Once multiple instances of restructuring are documented, the 
presence or absence of temporal rhythm is then determined by comparing 
the derived metric scores (see Table 3) across the two or more cases. 
Similarly, the presence or absence of periodicity is determined by 
comparing the time lags between catalysts and appearance of elements. A 
final temporal measurement represents the total time the enacting unit 
was engaged in disaster related action. Involvement begins at the point 
of the unit's initial commitment to disaster related activities. It 
ends with the last documented action by the enacting unit. Just as with 
instances of restructuring, total time of involvement is measured in 
days and hours.
The previously discussed spatial properties are measured in the 
following way. Location refers to the geographic locus of the unit
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during the restructuring: in this study within the political boundaries
of the locality, county, or state. Dispersion is a measure of the 
number of specific sites of a unit’s action during a restructuring: in
this study one site, two to four sites, or five or more sites. Where 
there were multiple instances of restructuring, pattern then measures 
the consistency or inconsistency of location across multiple cases. In 
like derived fashion, uniformity measures the similarity or 
dissimilarity of dispersion across multiple cases.
Enacting Unit Chacteristics
Five variables reflect closed system characteristics of the 
enacting units. First, because those units providing services to 
disaster victims were both mental health and non-mental health related, 
the former is distinguished from the latter. Second, the size of the 
enacting unit is measured as an ordinal scale: 9 or fewer members;
10-20 members; 21-50 members; 51-100 members; and more than 100 
members. An ordinal scale is used because finer distinctions could not 
be made from archival data for many units in the study. Third, the 
number of subunits is a general measure of the structural complexity of 
the enacting unit. Fourth, the number of tasks (during the disaster) is 
a general measure of the formalization of the enacting unit. Fifth, the 
presence of conflict (overt disagreement) within the enacting unit about 
what it was doing at any point during its response is represented as 
presence or absence (yes or no).
Four variables reflect open system characteristics of the enacting 
units. First, those cases where the motivation to restructure came from 
other units are distinguished from those where the restructuring was
25
internally generated. Second, the complexity of the social environment 
of the enacting unit is measured as the number of units in its social 
network during restructuring. Note that such linkages involved various 
combinations of local, state, and national organizations. Note also 
that the total number of linkages could vary across multiple instances 
of restructuring by the same unit. Third, the presence of conflict 
(overt disagreement) between the enacting unit and at least one other 
unit about what it was doing at any point during its response is 
represented by a dummy variable (yes or no). Fourth, a determination of 
whether the response was beneficial for the enacting unit was measured 
by status enhancement. Specifically, if the restructuring resulted in 
an increase in status--as communicated by units in its broader social 
network of the enacting unit--it was so designated.
DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS
A total OF 57 cases of restructuring (enacted by 22 social units) 
have been reconstructed from archival descriptions of the delivery of 
mental health services to victims following the tornado. Table 4 arrays 
the 57 cases by form type (see Table 1) and derived metric score (see 
Table 3). Note that 28 percent (18/64) of the logically possible forms 
of restructuring have been located at least once. This includes 3 of 4 
one-element forms, 6 of 12 two-element forms, 3 of 24 three-element 
forms and 6 of 24 four element forms. The marginal distributions 
indicate that over two-thirds of the cases are one- (N=25 or 44 percent) 
or two- (N=13 or 23 percent) element forms of restructuring.
Three-element forms represent 12 percent (N=7) of the cases and
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four-element forms represent 21 percent (N=12) of the cases. It is 
evident from the table that the order or patterning of the elements 
points to administrative rationality when 1-3 elements are involved (41 
of 45 cases have negative scores on the derived metric); and to 
substantive rationality when all 4 elements are involved (8 of 12 cases 
have positive signs on the derived metric). Recall that pure balance 
between substantive and administrative rationality (a score of 0 on the 
derived metric) is possible only at the four-element level of form.
Three of 12 cases reflect pure balance as defined by the metric.
Overall, administrative rationality prevails in this sample of 57 cases. 
This is evidenced, in part, by the tendency toward fewer elements 
restructured and the mean and median scores on the derived metric (mean 
of -3.5 and median of -4). But one must be careful not to overstate the 
implications of this finding. Many of the cases show both means- and 
ends-based restructuring taking place. This strain toward balancing of 
administrative and substantive rationality is evidenced also by lower 
(positive or negative) scores on the derived metric. And as will be 
shown below, much of the means-based restructuring which occurred was 
based on emergent rather than established ends.
With respect to the timing of restructuring, the elapsed times 
between catalysts and appearing elements are as follows: The mean time
lag between catalyst and first appearing element is 6 days-7 hours, 
while the median score is 1 day-5 hours (range of 1 hour to 63 days).
The distribution therefore points to a considerable degree of positive 
skewness, with the bulk of the cases (42) piling up below the mean.
Where two to four elements are restructured, the mean time lag between
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first and second element (N=32) is 4 days-3 hours, (median of 1 day and 
a range of 1 hour to 37 days); from second to third element (N=19) is 4 
days-16 hours (median of 8 hours and a range of 1 hour to 70 days); and 
from third to fourth element (N=12) is 7 hours (median of 1 day-12 hours 
and a range of 1 hour to 17 days. The average total time of 
restructuring (N=57) is 10 days-19 hours (median of 4 days-10 hours and 
range of 8 hours to 81 days-12 hours). The average total time of 
involvement in disaster related activities by the 22 identified units 
was 162 days-17 hours (with a median of 63 days-12 hours and a range of 
4 days-12 hours to 548 days). An overall indication of positive 
skewness is therefore reflected in the data, with much restructuring 
taking place within the relatively narrow time window of the immediate 
emergency period.
With respect to the two basic spatial dynamics of form, location 
and dispersion, 51 percent (N=29) of the instances of restructuring were 
enacted by units located in the impacted community and 49 percent (N=28) 
were enacted by units located at the county level (location). Fourteen 
percent of the restructurings (N=8) were confined to a single site, 18 
percent (N=10) involved 2-4 sites, and 68 percent (N=39) involved 5 or 
more sites (dispersion).
What does the data on restructuring mean in summary form?
Consistent with much contemporary research on organizing in non-disaster 
settings, the data suggest that restructuring following disaster tends 
to take place within the constraints of antecedent ends. As will be 
illustrated below, these ends may be either established prior to the 
event or emergent. When ends are established and relatively fixed,
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administrative rationality prevails. Means-based restructuring implies 
considerable clarity about what the organization is trying to do and 
how. We conclude that organizational routines serve the unit well in 
everday as well as unusual circumstances by enhancing predictability 
about what is going on. But when ends are emergent--and the data 
suggests that this is a frequent occurrence--a more thoroughgoing 
restructuring of means and ends is undertaken. Here the actor innovates 
to enhance the performance of the unit. Perhaps a problem is being 
anticipated. Or maybe a problem is sufficiently telling that it can no 
longer be overlooked (Starbuck, 1983). In either case, the evidence 
indicates that often previously fixed ends are altered early in the 
process of restructuring. In this circumstance substantive rationality 
is evidenced; perhaps there is less collective clarity about what the 
organization is doing; but the result may be greater adaptiveness to 
changing circumstances.
In addition to the dynamics of administrative and substantive 
rationality, the timing of element changes during restructuring is an 
analytically distinct characteristic of form. The data indicate that, 
on the average, time lags between catalysts and element changes tend to 
decrease as more elements come into play. This means that with 2-4 
element restructurings, the appearance of change in the first element is 
more tentative than what comes later. Note that the units in this 
presumed mental health delivery system had little or no disaster 
experience. This lack of experience implies that the people involved 
were uncertain about the proper courses of action. Consistent with 
collective behavior theory (e.g., Turner and Killian, 1972), the
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resulting timing of element changes points to symbolic milling when 
routines are disrupted and collective attempts to reduce ambiguity. But 
whether it is existing or emergent ends that reduce uncertainty, once 
restructuring is underway a kind of structural momentum is created.
This momentum is important following disaster because there is, indeed, 
pressure to get things done. In summary form at least, the timing of 
restructuring evidences that pressure. What takes place points to the 
relevance of both innovativeness and structural inertia.
With respect to spatial dynamics of form, the data on location 
conform to the historical pattern in the United States that disasters 
are community events and treated as such. Thus social units in close 
proximity to impacted areas respond quickly to local needs because there 
is a clear expectation that they will do so. This expectation is 
enhanced here by the fact that, although highly destructive, tornadoes 
tend to have a relatively narrow scope of impact (Dynes, 1970). On the 
other hand, the data on dispersion suggest that within a relatively 
circumscribed community response, victim services tended to be provided 
at multiple rather than single locations. The evidence points to an 
outreach approach to perceived victim needs.
The dynamics of administrative and substantive rationality, time, 
and space will now be illustrated by several case descriptions from the 
data file of 57 cases. Four examples involving 1, 2, 3, and 4 element 
forms of restructuring will be described and discussed. This will be 
followed by a description and discussion of one example of multiple 
restructurings by a single unit. In developing the latter example, two 
additional summary tables (Tables 5 and 6) which distinguish single from
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multiple restructurings will be presented and their implications 
highlighted with respect to the derived temporal (rhythm, periodicity) 
and spatial (pattern, uniformity) characteristics of restructuring.
One-, Two-, Three-, and Four-Element Forms of Restructuring
Restructuring: One-Element Form - (A)
Enacting Unit: Multiple County Mental Health Agency
Case Description
The catalyst for this instance of restructuring was the tornado. 
Response to the event was initiated by the director of a mental health 
unit. The unit had extensive contacts prior to the disaster with six 
local organizations, some mental health related and some not. The 
enacting unit was not physically located in the impacted area, but in an 
adjoining county. It maintained a small professional staff (10-15) and 
over 100 regular volunteers. The unit's multiple county domain was 
implemented by three core sub-units: one representing each associated
county. The unit's task structure was comprised of educational 
services, direct volunteer services, community mental health, advocacy, 
advisory services, and administrative services. Even as it responded to 
the event, the unit maintained its routine activities. During 
restructuring, the enacting unit was linked with six other units. These 
relationships had been established prior to the disaster and no new 
contacts were made as a result of the event.
The restructuring which occurred is judged to be an A form in 
Kreps' taxonomy (see Table 1). Its score on the derived metric is -4, 
pointing to administrative rationality. The restructuring began the 
morning following the disaster, some 14 hours post-impact. The total
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time of restructuring was another 14 hours and was enacted from one 
location. The total time of involvement of the unit in disaster related 
activities was 13 days-2 hours. Further details on the restructuring 
are as follows.
The director believed that his agency should offer assistance to 
those groups and organizations in the impacted community with which it 
maintained contacts on a routine basis. In contacting these units, his 
professional staff found that they had been unable to develop plans for 
dealing with the consequences of the event. Accordingly, the staff felt 
that they could assist in this situation by establishing contacts, times 
and places for planning meetings. Such actions were a part of the 
normal functioning of the agency, but now redirected specifically to the 
tornado event. Activities (A) were being restructured by the next 
morning, while the remaining elements of organization remained fixed. 
Over a period of about 14 hours contacts were made, and times and 
locations for possible meetings involving member organizations were 
arranged. The ostensible purpose of the meetings was to develop plans 
for responding to the needs of victims. By arranging these meetings, 
the staff felt that they were responding in an appropriate manner and, 
in so doing, taking some of the pressure off local units in the impacted 
area. The initial meeting was set up for the Monday following the 
disaster. At that time, the professional staff turned over all 
information they had on the event and meeting arrangements that they had 
been involved in. Subsequent meetings were carried out in various 
locations, with the focal unit continuing to assist in their 
arrangement. After about 13 days, the focal unit ceased disaster
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related activities altogether. At least in part, this was a function of 
opposition to the enacting unit's disaster related activities.
Specifically, conflict arose over the agency's role in arranging 
the meetings. The conflict was of an overt nature and came from the 
local groups and organizations that were being assisted. Many members 
of these latter units expressed the idea that it was not the place of an 
outside agency to impinge on their areas of responsibility. Many felt 
that the meetings were not developed with their interests in mind and 
that they were not properly consulted in the arrangements of meetings. 
The end result of this opposition was that the director of the agency 
indicated that his staff would stop making arrangements unless specific 
requests were forthcoming. In the absence of such requests, the unit 
ceased all disaster related activities shortly thereafter. The 
professional staff expressed the thought that what they were doing was 
worthwhile. While local groups and organizations lacked consensus on 
the usefulness of arrangement activities, representatives of several 
county, state, and federal agencies agreed that the actions of the 
multiple county mental health agency were beneficial. They stated that 
the speed with which the unit responded was central in the establishment 
of victim services.
Case Discussion
As described, the above case description points to a one-element 
form of restructuring involving activities (A). There is a strain 
toward administrative rationality and this is reflected by (1) the logic 
of the metric score (-4), (2) the rapid involvement of the agency, (3) 
the fact that the restructuring was a simple extension of organizational
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routines, and (4) the expeditious manner in which efforts led to early 
results. At the same time, however, what amounted to a very efficient 
response led to overt opposition from the groups and organizations 
ostensibly being assisted. Alternative courses of action-- including 
doing nothing for a time--appeared not to be considered. And certainly 
the opposition that ensued was not anticipated by the professional 
staff. Responding to opposition only after it became overt, the result 
was the suspension of a coordination role soon after it began.
One heuristic and potentially practical value of the taxonomy is 
that it provides a way of characterizing alternatives to what actually 
took place. In other words, the restructuring could have been enacted 
in a different way and the taxonomy shows how. For example, the manner 
in which meetings were arranged (T) might have been altered to 
accommodate the massive disruption of the early emergency period. One 
benefit might have been a greater balance of administrative and 
substantive rationality. But one cost might have been that the process 
of getting something going was unnecessarily delayed in the face of 
pressing victim needs. An implied disaster management objective appears 
to be as follows: seek a balance between administrative and
substantively rationality while avoiding any trade-off in meeting victim 
needs in a timely manner.
Restructuring: Two Element Form - (A-R)
Enacting Unit: Religious Social Services Organization
Case Description
The catalyst for restructuring was the disaster event. Response by 
the unit began much later than that presented in the previous case
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description. The delayed response was, in part, a function of the 
unit's distance from the impacted area. The unit was not located within 
the immediate three county area; and while it had previous contacts 
with the impacted community and surrounding county because they were a 
part of its formal service area, these contacts were not sustained on a 
regular basis. The precise size of the unit was not indicated in the 
archives, but its broad range of routine activities included marriage 
counseling, family counseling, child welfare, foster care, adoption, and 
parish services. These activities were performed by both paid 
professionals and large numbers of volunteers. During the course of its 
response to the disaster, the organization maintained links with two 
units in the impacted county and one unit in the impacted community.
The restructuring which occurred is judged to be an A-R form in 
Kreps' taxonomy. Its score on the the derived metric is -7, pointing to 
administrative rationality. The restructuring began about 21 days 
following the disaster, with the total time of restructuring being about 
58 days. The total time of involvement for this unit was 548 days. 
Elapsed time from first to second element was 37 days. This means that 
the unit was still functioning in the impacted community at the time of 
the completion of the study by DRC. The activities of the unit were 
dispersed over more than five sites. As described in the archives, the 
restructuring occurred in the following way.
On the twenty-second day following impact a paid professional staff 
member--one who had experience working with disaster victims--was sent 
to the impacted area with instructions to assist disaster victims in any 
manner deemed appropriate by local authorities. The organization's
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activities (A) were therefore being restructured, albeit slightly 
because of the disaster, and within routine guidelines of providing 
service where there was need. Indeed, prior to sending the professional 
to the impacted area, there was a formal determination that the 
organization would not overstep specific requests for help by local 
authorities. Because those requests were forthcoming, the staff member 
was then advised to select a permanant facility for the unit's 
activities. A permanant office for the unit was established some 30 
days after the staff member had entered the community (R). This is 
judged to be a modest restructuring of resources, yielding an A-R form 
from Kreps' taxonomy. The data suggest that a major problem in this 
regard was a shortage of physical space. But once the office was set 
up, the professional staff person used it as base of operations for 
providing the organization's traditional services. The services were 
implemented at local parishes, schools, and the Red Cross. They 
continued over a period of DRC's 18 month study and were formally funded 
for a minimum of another 7 months.
Case Discussion
In effect, the enacting organization made a commitment to provide 
services, but within the constraints of a previously defined domain and 
tasks. Thus the ends of organization were not restructured in any way 
and the restructuring of means was modest. The enactment also evidences 
a formal decision that local prerogatives would not be overstepped. In 
contrast to the previous case description, one result of this decision 
was that no opposition developed over what the unit was doing. The 
involvement of the unit in disaster related activities was characterized
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by others as helpful and in no way detrimental.
The means-based restructuring which took place falls at the 
extremes of administrative rationality (metric score of -7). The case 
shows that administrative rationality does not necessarily equate with 
speed--certainly many of the unit's services could have been provided 
much earlier--but also with caution and the perceived neccessity of 
fitting in. The restructuring was a smooth but not necessarily a timely 
and sufficient one. On the positive side, the unit's activities were 
sustained and valued by others. On the minus side, the pragmatism was 
arguably inefficient. Not only did the unit respond rather late, but it 
then took several weeks to find an office because of the limited number 
of physical locations available.
By the logic of the derived metric, substantive rationality was not 
relevant to this restructuring. This lends support to the conclusion 
that structural inertia is not necessarily maladaptive. But once again, 
Kreps' taxonomy provides ways of characterizing not only what did happen 
but what might have been. For example, because of the substantial 
resources it could draw on, the unit's response could have begun much 
sooner and been more elaborate than it was. But to do either would 
undoubtedly have involved a greater restructuring of organizational 
routines as well as the manner in which services were delivered on site. 
In that event, tasks (T) would have been restructured, and perhaps very 
early in the process, thus pointing to substantive rationality. In 
considering the proper and longer-term goals of the unit, its members 
did not consider short term goals of disaster victims. Yet given the 
nature of disaster response in the United States--and the apparent
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knowledge of it by the social unit--a case can be made that the course 
of action taken was a suitable one.
Restructuring: Three Element Form - (A-T-R)
Enacting Unit: Counseling-Intervention Agency
Case Description
The catalyst for this instance of restructuring was the tornado. 
Response to the event was initiated by members of the enacting unit.
The unit was physically located in the heart of the impact area and its 
pre-disaster domain was related to mental health. The unit had five 
full-time professionals and at least 45 registered volunteers. While 
the archives provide no indication of a breakdown of the organization 
into specific subunits, the agency's formally stated tasks included 
advocacy programs, drug education, drug treatment, suicide prevention, 
dating guidance, family intervention, individual intervention, V.D. 
counseling, birth control counseling, abortion counseling, and volunteer 
counseling. The unit also maintained a hot-line service. The hotline 
service operated on a small scale and was not defined as a major 
function of the unit. As a mental health agency, the unit maintained a 
large number of linkages with other groups and organizations prior to 
the disaster. Most were at the local level (18), but there were several 
at state (3) or national (3) levels as well.
The restructuring which occurred is judged to be an A-T-R form in 
Kreps1 taxonomy. Its score on the derived metric is -3, suggesting the 
greater relevance of means as opposed to ends-based adaptation. The 
restructuring began 1 hour following impact, and the total time of 
restructuring was 13 hours. Elapsed time from first to second element
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was 4 hours, and from second to third was 8 hours. While the unit's 
pre-disaster location was the locus of activities during and after the 
restructuring, the activities were dispersed over many sites (damage 
areas and other responding units) during the immediate emergency period 
as well as later. The total time of involvement of the unit in disaster 
related activites was over 217 days. This initial restructuring was one 
of several enacted by the unit (the rest will be described later as 
parts of a multiple restructuring example). It was enacted as follows.
The unit began responding to disaster related information needs 
shortly after impact (1 hour). By chance, it was one of the few units 
in the immediate impact area that maintained telecommunications. That, 
combined with public knowledge of its hotline service, resulted in the 
staff receiving phone calls related to the disaster (A). The volume of 
calls was quite high and there was initial uncertainty about what do 
about them. The result was a decision to suspend all routine activities 
and to develop a new division of labor related to monitoring calls, 
referring requests or offers of assistance to the proper authorities, 
and transmitting information by phone or by messenger (T). The focus of 
the initial message service related to maintaining linkages among mental 
health agencies. Members of the unit then recruited additional 
volunteers because they were needed to provide the expanded service (R). 
The development of what amounted to small scale message center and 
referral service during the emergency period took less than one full 
day. The service remained in operation for about two weeks, at which 
time most of local telecommunications had been restored.
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Case Discussion
The above example again reveals a strain toward administrative 
rationality (-3 on the metric), the speed of the response was a function 
of a perceived need, the closeness of the unit to areas of damage, and 
the fact that the actions taken were an extension from organizational 
routines. But there is also evidence of ends-based restructuring 
playing a key intervening role. Thus routines were suspended, a new 
divison of labor was created, and this division of labor required a 
restructuring of resources. What took place is a good example of 
Durkheim's quotation at the beginning of this paper: the continuity and
discontinuity of human action in social structure. And the greater 
balance between substantive and administrative rationality evidenced 
appeared to enhance both the efficiency and effectiveness of the unit. 
The restructuring of ends led to a focused information service. But the 
constraint of both old and new ends provided the knowledge and logic 
needed for using resources in an appropriate and timely manner.
Interestingly, prior to the disaster the counseling-intervention 
agency had been involved in a debate over the adequacy of its staff and 
volunteers for implementing a mental health domain. This had resulted 
in some opposition to the operations of the agency, particularly by an 
oversight board to which the unit was responsible. Because of this 
opposition, the members of the enacting unit had begun negotiating for a 
merger with another mental health unit. The merger was to have taken 
place at the end of the year. As a result of a favorable response to 
the agency's disaster related activities by its proposed partner to the 
merger, a joint decision was made that the merger should be moved ahead
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by six months. This initial restructuring was part of a series that 
enhanced the credibility and status of the enacting unit.
Restructuring: Four Element Form - (D-T-R-A)
Metropolitan Religious Association
Case Description
The disaster event was the catalyst for this instance of 
restructuring. The director of the association initially offered the 
resources of its member units to a variety of local and regional 
organizations. The Red Cross was the first organization to respond to 
his offer by requesting the development of a food service system. The 
central office of the association was located in an adjoining county to 
that of the impacted community. The association had 5 full-time 
professionals and several hundred volunteers from 15 member churches.
Its formally defined regular tasks were as follows: campus ministry,
church missions, criminal justice, cable television, political action, 
mental health, public education, senior citizens programs, hospital 
referrals, housing, chaplin services, social service programs, tax 
.guidance, and membership advocacy. The association normally maintained 
numerous contacts with local, regional, and national organizations. 
During the restructuring and the events which followed, the association 
was linked with 18 local, 3 state, and 3 national organizations.
The restructuring reported here is judged to be a D-T-R-A form in 
Kreps' taxonomy. Its score on the derived metric is +4, suggesting that 
substantive rationality was at work. The restructuring began one hour 
following impact, with the request by the Red Cross to establish a food 
service system. The total time of the restructuring took 4 1/2 days
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and, once implemented, the food services were provided for approximately 
two weeks. Elapsed time from catalyst to first element was 1 day-5 
hours, from first to second element 3 days, from second to third 4 
hours, and from third to fourth 1 hour. Although the food was served at 
a single site, tasks related to buying and preparing the food were 
performed at many other (more than 5) locations. This initial 
restructuring was one of several by the enacting unit. The unit was 
still involved in disaster related activities at the completion of DRC's 
study (18 months from the disaster event).
Almost immediately following the disaster, the director of the 
association told his professional staff to begin offering the assistance 
of the association--and without specifying any restrictions--to a number 
of groups and organizations in the impacted community. The following 
morning the Red Cross made the request for the development of a food 
services system under association auspices. Speaking on behalf of the 
association, the director agreed to take on this responsibility.
Because the association had never been involved in this sphere of 
activity before, the formal acceptance of the responsibility involved a 
restructuring of the association's domain (D). Focused efforts were 
then made to develop a new task structure related to the planning of 
nutritious meals, the purchasing, preparation, and serving of food, the 
maintenance of proper sanitation, the location of facilities, and the 
mobilization of volunteers from member churches (T). Following the 
development of a workable set of tasks, the mobilization of the 
necessary resources to get started took place (R). As stated above, the 
system was fully operational some 4 1/2 days after the restructuring
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began, and was suspended about two weeks later. The archives provide no 
evidence of either internal or external conflict related to the 
development or implementation of this food service system. The 
membership judged the service to be of value and consistent with the 
goals of the association. The association's work was judged to be of 
great assistance by other social units.
Case Discussion
In contrast to the second example, the enacting unit made a 
commitment to provide disaster related services, but not necessarily 
within the constraints of a previously defined domain. Thus the change 
of ends--and substantive rationality--was critical for what took place; 
and all four elements of organization were involved in the 
restructuring. The first element implicated was domain (D). The 
director and his staff were innovating, yet within a general value 
system that supported helping behavior. A strain toward substantive 
rationality continued with the restructuring of tasks (T). Once 
collective representations of what was to be done and how were 
crystalized, means based restructuring took over.
Following the restructuring of ends, the unfolding events give the 
appearance of inevitability that is consistent with the earlier example 
of fixed ends and administative rationality. But the unit might not 
have been able to pull off the reorganizing. For example, members of 
the association might have rejected the new domain or tasks. Things 
could have fallen apart at the level of resource mobilization. Or it 
could have been later determined that the service was not needed. An 
implied value of Kreps1 taxonomy is that it provides a way of describing
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failed as well as successful attempts to create (origins) or restructure 
organization. Moreover, it implies that in some other type of disaster, 
the food service system might emerge very differently while being no 
less organized (Kreps, 1985). In this example, the demands of 
efficiency and effectiveness appeared to be equally well-served. The 
unit improvised and in an orderly fashion. The example points to an 
important paradox. The actor is subject of structure just as his 
response is order driven. Or as Durkheim and Weber might put it, people 
are creating structure but are impelled by ultimate values. The values 
which motivate them are external as well as internal (Alexander, 1982).
Multiple Restructurings by a Single Unit
In this section an example of multiple restructurings by a single 
unit will be described. Following this description two additional 
tables (Tables 5 and 6) will be presented. The tables will be used to 
summarize findings on multiple restructurings and the derived temporal 
(rhythm, periodicity) and spatial measures of form (pattern, 
uniformity). Table 5 arrays the 57 instances of restructuring by 
enacting unit. In cases of multiple restructurings by the same unit, 
the forms of restructuring are arranged in chronological order. Table 6 
depicts the 57 instances of restructuring with respect to time lags from 
catalysts to the first appearing element and any subsequent elements 
involved in a restructuring.
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Multiple Restructuring: A-T-R, A-T-R-D, T-R, T-R-A, R, R-A, D-T-R-A 
Enacting Unit: Counseling-Intervention Agency
Case Description
The enacting unit and the initial restructuring are the same as 
that described earlier as an example of a three-element form of 
restructuring (A-T-R). The description and interpretation of that 
restructuring will not be repeated here. Rather, subsequent events will 
be described as they unfolded from the completion of the initial 
restructuring. Recall that the unit adapted initially by providing a 
message service immediately following the event. The service continued 
for about two weeks or until telecommunications were restored. The 
catalyst for the second restructuring was the result of an issue that 
developed very early following the initial restructuring. The resulting 
second restructuring is judged to be an A-T-R-D form in the taxonomy.
Its score on the derived metric is -2, indicating a slight strain toward 
administrative rationality. The catalyst appeared 20 hours after the 
disaster event (6 hours from initial restructuring). The restructuring 
began about 7 hours after the catalyst and took about 2 days to 
complete. Just as in the case of the first restructuring, unit 
activities were dispersed over more than five sites. Elapsed time from 
element one to two was about 4 hours; from two to three was close to 8 
hours; and from three to four was 1 day.
The catalyst is expressed in the archives as concern by the staff 
and volunteers about the adequacy of the messages being transmitted and, 
more importantly, their felt need for a broader scope in the agency's 
emergency activities. The message service--which had taken about 14 
hours to set up--was focused on linking mental health units, with this
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agency playing the role of conduit. But as a function of their 
concerns, the members of the agency began to expand that role within 
hours. (Note that we are dealing with the immediate emergency period 
and the enacting unit was located in the heart of the impact area.)
Their innovativeness led ultimately to a legitimated emergency 
communications and coordination domain. Rather than simply receive and 
transmit messages from mental health units, the staff and volunteers 
began actively seeking timely information from a variety of groups and 
organizations on the status of the emergency and pressing needs. Some 
members began to coordinate meetings, locations, or other activities for 
many responding individuals, groups, and organizations. In effect, the
scope of activities expanded in size, with the unit serving firms,
hospitals, public bureaucracies, and social service organizations (A). 
With the rapid development of these activities a new task structure 
quickly emerged to monitor, control (and not lose), distribute, and use 
the many bits of information that were being processed (T). This 
expanded tasks structure then called for still additional volunteers who 
were recruited over the next several hours (R). About a day later, the
legitimation of the agency's communication and coordination activities
was evidenced by the many units working with it (D). The agency 
maintained this domain for some 14 days (16+ days after the event and 
the effective end of the immediate emergency period).
The third restructuring is judged to be a T-R form in the taxonomy. 
Here the metric score is +1, revealing a slight strain toward 
substantive rationality. The catalyst was concern expressed by the 
professional staff about the appropriateness of volunteers for handling
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the expanded responsibilities of the agency. The concern was evident 
some 12 hours following the end of the second restructuring (3 1/2 days 
from the disaster event). The volume and diversity of information and 
requests for action were quite high (about 1200 calls per day at its 
peak). It was stated that while the volunteers were doing a good job, 
the staff sought greater continuity by having people who could work 
longer hours and who had certified managerial skills. In effect, the 
staff redefined respective roles of professional and volunteer during 
the emergency--asserting the prerogatives of the former and restricting 
those of the latter. The result was a redefinition of tasks to reflect 
professional requirements (T). This was accomplished in about 12 hours. 
The staff then recruited and hired two additional full-time 
professionals (R). The length of and funding for employment were not 
clear at the time of hiring. In any case, that part of the 
restructuring took about one day. The total time of restructuring was 1 
1/2 days (completed 5 1/2 days following impact). Unit activities 
continued to be dispersed over more than 5 areas.
The fourth restructuring is judged to be a T-R-A form in the 
taxonomy. The derived metric score was -1 indicating a slight strain 
toward administrative rationality. The catalyst was an innovative idea 
for handling the volume of communications flowing into and out of the 
agency. The idea, which was circulating almost immediately following 
the hiring of two new professionals (5 1/2 days post-disaster), was a 
suggestion to develop a regular community information sheet. Elapsed 
time from catalyst to the first appearing element was 12 hours; from 
first to second one hour; and from second to third one hour. The total
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time of restructuring was therefore 14 hours (some 6 1/2+ days following 
impact).
The staff had been using volunteers as runners to gather and 
distribute information materials. Someone (it is not clear who) 
suggested that it would be helpful if a regular information sheet was 
developed for the community. The sheet could include information 
related to community needs and resources. For example, the sheet 
developed later included the names of stores, other business, and 
churches that were open, disaster relief sites, emergency loan sites, 
and mental health assistance sites. The restructuring began with a 
determination of what would be included on the sheet as well as various 
job assignments related to its production and distribution (T).
Following that, things happened very quickly: with the assignment of
staff and volunteers and the purchasing of necessary materials (R); 
then the actual onset of work related to the community information 
sheets (A). The agency sustained these activities for 30 days.
The fifth restructuring is judged to be an R form from the 
taxonomy. Its derived metric score is -3, indicating administrative 
rationality. The catalyst here was the previously stated hiring of the 
two full-time professionals (completed some 5 1/2 days post-disaster). 
The archives indicate that the new employees began working without a 
specification of length of employment and only the expectation that 
money would become available. About 12 hours following the completion 
of the fourth restructuring (7 days post-disaster), the agency received 
funding authorization from the state to fund the two additional 
professionals (retroactively) for 30 days (R). Although the archives
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are not precise about timing, sometime during the firing-authorization 
interim, the agency director addressed the problem of funding and 
negotiated the 30 days additional salaries. The monies from state 
mental health authorities were then received one week later.
The sixth restructuring is judged to be an R-A form in the 
taxonomy, thus pointing to administrative rationality on the derived 
metric (-7). The catalyst for the restructuring was a suggestion by 
federal authorities that laypersons be trained as para-professionals to 
assist in aiding disaster victims. The suggestion was made at a meeting 
14 days after the disaster event (6 days after completion of the
proceeding restructuring). Elapsed time from the catalyst to the
restructuring of the first element was 1 day; and from first to second
element was 1 hour. Thus the total time of restructuring was slightly
more than 1 day. As with all previous restructurings, the activities of 
the unit were dispersed over more than 5 areas.
This instance of restructuring began when members of the 
counseling-intervention unit responded favorably to the suggestion by 
assigning 2 members of its professional staff to train and debrief 
para-professionals (R). The activities (A) themselves began very 
quickly but did not disrupt normal routines. The routines themselves 
were re-emerging as the immediate emergency period was waning. The 
training and debriefing sessions required no more than one person-day 
per week of staff time. Unit members were involved in this activity for 
about three months.
yThe seventh and final form of restructuring in the series is judged 
to be a D-T-R-A form in the taxonomy. It receives a score of +4,
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indicating a strain toward substantive rationality on the derived 
metric. The catalyst for this restructuring was criticism of the agency 
by its local oversight board. Prior to the disaster the oversight board 
had questioned the adequacy of both the professional and volunteer staff 
to perform mental health activities. This criticism was sustained over 
a considerable period of time. While the criticism noticeably subsided 
following the disaster, it reappeared about 88 days after the event (74 
days after the completion of the last restructuring). This time the 
criticism served as a catalyst for the agency’s merger with another 
local unit--in effect, expediting a process that was already under way. 
While the agency was still providing services at more than five sites, 
such services were associated with its routine functions rather than 
disaster related activities.
Approximately six months prior to the disaster, the agency had 
begun negoitiations with another local mental health unit in the hope of 
merging. Some tentative plans had been made, but the proposed date of 
the merger was over a year away. As a result of its favorable 
evaluation of the agency’s disaster related activities, the leadership 
of the proposed partner suggested that the merger should be pushed ahead 
by six months. A formal meeting between the partners to the merger took 
place one day after the catalyst. During that meeting the general 
framework under which the new unit would operate was determined (D).
Then over a period of about 14-15 days job descriptions and assignments 
were negotiated and agreed upon (T). Late in the negotiations (last few 
hours), final agreements were reached on the location of the facility 
for the merger (the site of the unit being referenced here as
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restructuring) and a necessary (slight) reduction of personnel (R). As 
depicted in the archives, the merger developed without conflict between 
the merged units and with acceptance of the merger by the oversight 
board. The new unit began operations about 17 days later. The 
resulting total time of restructuring was 32 days. The newly created 
unit was on-going at the end of the DRC study (18 months following the 
disaster).
Multiple Restructuring Discussion
There were seven restructurings in the example presented above.
The sequence of metric scores is as follows: -3, -2, +1, -1, -4, -7,
+4. While 5 of the 7 restructurings evidence slight to greater degrees 
of administrative rationality, the mean score is -1.71. This measure of 
central tendency is apropos of the greater balancing of administrative 
and substantive rationality that is revealed by what happened. The 
pivotal point to recognize is that much of the means-based restructuring 
that prevailed was impelled by improvised rather than predetermined 
ends. Thus substantive rationality was relevant at strategic points in 
a continuing process. Without attention to the details of that process 
(Collins, 1981; Wallace, 1983), the subtle interplay of action and 
order would escape detection. Such detection supports the dialectical 
foundation of actor and unit in structure (Alexander, 1982; Rossi,
1983).
Actor as object of structure was crucial at several points to the 
enacting unit's rapid and arguably efficient response to pressing needs. 
Indeed, the absence of administrative rationality could have meant the 
downfall of the unit. That is to say, the archives suggest that too
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much reflection and questioning about either old or new ends would have 
been maladaptive. But at the same time, the actor as subject of 
structure was critical for the viability of the unit in both the short- 
and long-term. In the final restructuring, the unit merged with 
another. From the perspective of the enacting unit, the restructuring 
is characterized as D-T-R-A. Paradoxically, death was at the same time 
birth. The restructuring of the old points to substantive rationality 
using the metric developed here to capture the maintenance of 
organization. The birth of the new points to goal oriented rational 
action using the origins metric developed previously by Kreps (1985). 
Action and order are mutually constituted in structure regardless of 
which system state is being referenced.
With respect to derived temporal characteristics of form, the 
sequence of restructurings in this case (see Table 5) evidences the 
relative absence of rhythm as expressed by either metric scores or the 
sequential ordering of the elements. Note that on purely logical 
grounds, the metric provides for the possibility of both balance between 
administrative and substantive rationality and rhythm. This empirical 
example implies an inverse relationship between balance and rhythm. On 
the other hand, the example suggests that balance and periodicity are 
perhaps related (see Table 6). Specifically, the evidence of some 
periodicity in lag times between catalysts and elements in the first six 
restructurings is a function of the compression of administrative and 
substantive rationality within the narrow time window of the immediate 
crisis. The last restructuring (the merger) took much longer. It
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occurred outside the time window of the immediate emergency period and 
at a time when routines were being re-established in a less pressured 
circumstance.
With respect to derived spatial characteristics of form, no summary 
table is needed for this or, as will be indicated below, the remaining 
multiple restructurings. The evidence points to both pattern in 
location of the unit and uniformity in dispersion of the sites of unit 
activities during restructuring. However, neither finding is a foregone 
conclusion in the circumstance of disaster. A unit's location can be 
damaged or destroyed by primary or secondary impacts. And in the case 
of the merger in this example, the facility of the new unit need not 
have been that of the counseling agency. Moreover, the ostensible 
uniformity in the dispersion of activities is, to some degree, a 
function of the limits of the archival data. In this and the remaining 
cases, when activities were dispersed over more than 5 sites across 
multiple restructurings, the data are not fine-tuned enough to determine 
the outside parameters of the sheer number of sites or whether the sites 
themselves were constant. Certainly there was a great deal of 
uniformity from one restructuring to the next, but it was far from 
absolute.
In summary, the above enactment of multiple restructurings 
evidences a balancing of administrative and substantive rationality and, 
by implication, the relevance of efficiency and effectiveness criteria 
in emergency management. The former is grounded by speed of response. 
The latter is grounded by innovation in the face of changing 
circumstances. The case also evidences the lack of rhythm but
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periodicity in the face of urgency. Finally, it evidences both pattern 
and uniformity, although the former was clearly at issue with the last 
restructuring and the latter is probably overstated because of the 
limits of the data.
Referring again to Table 5, it arrays all 57 cases by enacting unit 
and a subsample of 46 cases that were part of multiple restructurings by 
the same unit. The latter 46 cases are listed in chronological order 
and by sequence of metric scores. Units 12-16 had two restructurings,
17 and 18 had three, 19 had five, 20 (the previosuly described 
counseling center) and 21 had 7, and the 22nd had 11 (the 4-element form 
described earlier was the first of a series). Note that Table 5 does 
not represent the entire universe of restructurings from the event. It 
only represents those yielded by the archives. Thus any interpretation 
is constrained by the limits of the data.
Several of the shorter (3 or less) sequences evidence rhythm as 
depicted by element arrangment and metric scores (units 13, 14, 15, and 
18). But with so few restructurings it is hard to tell what this means. 
Note that the longer sequences point to similar rhythm at points in the 
process, but only one case with more than 3 restructurings (unit 21) 
evidences rhythm overall. Of the five cases that show rhythm (13, 14, 
15, 18, 21), all but one (14) point to a clear pattern of administrative 
rationality. And consistent with the earlier case description of the 
counseling unit, there is a noticeable absence of rhythm with a greater 
balance of administrative and substantive rationality. This is 
evidenced most pointedly by units 12 (metric mean of -1.5), 16 (metric 
mean of 0), 19 (metric mean of -.6), 20 (metric mean of -1.71), and 22
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(metric mean of -1.82).
Table 6 arrays the same 22 enacting units by time lags between 
catalysts and appearing elements. Consistent with Table 5, the units 
are listed from single to multiple restructurings in an attempt to 
identify any periodicity in the multiples. The latter cases begin with 
unit 12 (a two restructuring sequence). Using unit 12 to illustrate the 
reading of the table, the time lag between catalyst and initial element 
is 4.5 days for the first restructuring and .5 days for the second 
restructuring. Reading to the right, the time lag between the first and 
second element is 1 day for the first restructuring and 1.5 days for the 
second restructuring. The element comparison stops at this point 
because the first restructuring involves all four elements and the 
second involves only two of them. The total time of restructuring was 
8.8 days for the first restructuring and 2 days for the second. Note 
that the overall correlation between number of elements present and 
total time of restructuring is virtually zero (.03) for this sample of 
57 cases.
What do the data on Table 6 suggest? Although periodicity is 
irrelevant to single element restructurings, note that 7 of 7 cases 
point to administrative rationality, but not necessarily to speed of 
response relative to the event (the initial catalyst). Moreover, two of 
the remaining four single restructurings also point to administrative 
rationality but neither speed nor periodicity. The last two cases 
(D-R-T-A and A-T forms) evidence balance of administrative and 
substantive rationality, speed in enactment of the first element, and 
some periodicity for the D-R-T-A case. Taken as a whole, the average
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time lag between event and the first restructured element is 8.8 days 
for the 11 single restructurings and the average total time of 
restructuring is 14.6 days.
Now examine the multiple restructurings to see a couple of patterns 
that build on the above findings. The multiple restructurings for the 
remaining 11 units evidence both greater speed in the initial 
restructuring (mean of 2.5 days for the initial element restructuring 
and 4.4 days for the total time of initial restructuring) as well as 
balance between administrative and substantive rationality. Two 
tentative but important inferences about the timing of disaster response 
follow: first, administrative rationality does not necessarily enhance
speed; and second, the longer it takes to restructure initially, the 
less likely will there be multiple restructurings.
The other major finding from the table is equally tentative but no 
less intriguing. It is highlighted most pointedly by the longer 
sequences of restructuring from units 20, 21, and 22. Recall from Table 
5 that units 20 and 22 evidence an inverse relationship between balance 
of means-ends restructuring and rhythm. Table 6 then evidences what 
appears to be a positive relationship between balance and periodicity, 
at least until late in the process (as pre-disaster routines are being 
re-established). On the other hand, case 21 seems to show an inverse 
relationships between administrative rationality and rhythm on the one 
hand, and periodicity on the other. The implied contrasts are as 
follows: balance equates with speed and periodicity, but not rhythm;
administrative rationality equates with rhythm, but not speed or 
periodicity A
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The thing to keep in mind here is that response during the 
immediate emergency period generally calls for speed, flexibility, and 
control in equal amounts. A balance between administrative and 
substantive rationality arguably meets this requirement. At the same 
time, the ways this unfolds are so contingent upon fluid circumstances 
that they are difficult to predicate as to their precise form from one 
restructuring to the next (low rhythm). Compare this to normal 
circumstances. Administrative rationality prevails in the absence of 
crisis because it increases clarity and predictability of organizational 
routines. Means are restructured with respect to fixed ends as 
contingencies come up. Because there is a certain randomness of these 
contingencies, routine restructurings are positively related with rhythm 
and inversely related with periodicity.
Multiple restructurings also inform the two derived spatial 
characteristics of structure. Once again, pattern refers to 
consistency-inconsistency of unit location across multiple 
restructurings. Uniformity refers to consistency-inconsistency in the 
dispersion of unit activities over multiple restructurings. The 
multiple restructurings by the 11 enacting units evidence substantial 
degrees of both pattern and uniformity. Only two of the units changed 
location and then only once. Both enacted three restructurings. These 
same two units also exhibited some inconsistency in the dispersion of 
activities. Each showed greater dispersion from first to second 
restructuring: with one decreasing again in its third restructuring;
and the other sustaining more dispersed activities.
The location of a social unit is probably one of its most stable
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features because it tends to be a fixed site and not changed without 
good reason. Change in the dispersion of unit activities is more 
readily accomplished. Still, neither change is particularly noticeable 
for this event. In part this is a function of the fact that many of the 
enacting units studied were propitiously located relative to impact, 
remained relatively free from damage, and had dispersed activities in 
pre- as well as post-disaster time periods. It is important to 
recognize, however, that timing, location, magnitude, and scope of 
impact have important contextual variables for any consideration of 
pattern and uniformity. The basic and derived spatial characteristics 
therefore should be pursued further because (1) modest variation was 
identified in this relatively circumscribed event and (2) there are many 
types of hazards that have very different characteristics of impact than 
that occurring here.
CONCLUSION
Disasters are useful contexts for studying process because 
catalysts for change tend to be pointed. Moreover, the time during 
which change unfolds can be measured within a relatively narrow period. 
The referent for change in this thesis is restructuring of organization. 
Restructuring is examined by using Kreps' structural theory and taxonomy 
as a framework for comparative study. The taxonomy points to four 
elements as discrete dimensions of structure. Domains and tasks are 
interpreted as ends of organization. Their restructuring empirically 
grounds substantive rationality. Resources and activities are
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interpreted as means of organization. Their restructuring empirically 
grounds administrative rationality. The case materials describe the 
content of restructuring during the maintenance state of organization. 
The derived metric describes the form of restructuring as falling on a 
continuum of administrative to substantive rationality. The thesis also 
emphasizes the analytical importance and distinctiveness of temporal and 
spatial characteristics of restructuring.
Major Findings
The theory and findings presented here suggest that there are many 
alternative but not an unlimited number of paths through which 
restructuring can occur. It should not be assumed that any one of the 
64 forms is more analytically central than any other. Rather, it should 
be assumed that all forms are possible and that which forms appear is 
dependent upon the physical, temporal, and social contexts in which they 
occur. The majority of the cases documented here involve one (25 of 57) 
or two (13 of 57) elements; and only means are involved in the vast 
majority of these cases. This suggests that the degree of restructuring 
is very much constrained by either pre-existing or emergent ends--and 
administrative rationality. Substantive rationality is far less in 
evidence and seems to be associated with more complete (4-element) 
restructurings (12 of 57 cases). Adaptiveness is certainly evidenced by 
these cases and it is bounded by established or emergent means.
Evidence of a balancing of substantive and administrative rationality is 
also quite noticeable in restructurings involving two, three, or four 
elements (32 of 57 cases). In sum, while strains toward either 
administrative or substantive rationality are documented, so too is a
64
strain toward a balance between them.
With respect to temporal characteristics, there is no correlation 
between the degree of restructuring (number of elements restructured) 
and length of enactment. There is evidence to suggest that the longer 
to takes to restructure initially, the less likely is there to be more 
of it. Forms of restructuring evidencing substantive rationality are 
the most infrequent. Accordingly, there has been reluctance to suggest 
even tentative interpretations of their temporal features.4 Forms 
evidencing administrative rationality are the most frequent, tend to 
show greater rhythm but less periodicity, and do not seem to be related 
with speed of response. Forms evidencing a balancing of substantive and 
administrative rationality reveal the absence of rhythm, the presence of 
speed, and some periodicity. The latter results, at least in part, from 
the fact that so much happened in a relatively short period of time.
With respect to spatial characteristics, with a few exceptions 
there was constancy of unit location (pattern) and dispersion of unit 
activities (uniformity). However, it should be emphasized that pattern 
is, in no small way, a function of the units selected for study in the 
original research and the type of event studied. And uniformity is 
overstated because there was imprecision about the number and specific 
sites of unit activities. It is felt that there are many insights about 
basic and derived spatial characteristics of structure waiting to be 
discovered. It is unfortunate, therefore, that far less progress has 
been made here in measurement of space as opposed to time.
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Final Comments
The emergency period of disaster demands improvised and rapid 
response with no trade-off between efficiency and effectiveness. The 
findings suggest that a balancing of administrative and substantive 
rationality increases the chance for this to occur. Too much 
administrative rationality and the unit suffers for lack of 
adaptiveness. Too much substantive rationality and the unit suffers for 
lack of clarity. The findings suggest also that it is difficult to 
predict how restructuring occurs because administrative rationality, 
substantive rationality, order, rhythm, timing, and periodicity are not 
simply related. The attempt here is to develop detailed descriptions 
about how these concepts relate, then derive interpretations that can 
later serve as testable hypotheses.
It must be kept in mind that this study is an initial attempt to 
capture the dynamics of restructuring with a theory that is itself in a 
preliminary stage of development. Thus, all findings must be viewed as 
tentative in nature. But even though the original DRC research was not 
done with this theory in mind, the archives provide the kind of data 
base that is essential for theory building. Simply put, little can be 
done without the details provided by the archives. What is needed at 
this point is primary data collection on the process of restructuring in 
different types of disasters. Certainly a much larger sample of 
multiple restructurings will be needed. And certainly the data 
production problems for studying process are major. But with the kind 
of focused design that is now possible, many of these problems can be 
overcome.
66
Continuing work with the theory is important for both theoretical 
and practical reasons. On the applied side, a balancing of 
administrative and substantive rationality is appropriately viewed as a 
goal toward which emergency management must strive. Concepts like 
efficiency and effectiveness will remain elusive. However, this study 
provides important insights about how they relate. Efficiency seems 
nicely wedded with a pattern of administrative rationality and rhythm.
At the same time there is lack of periodicity because means change only 
as contingecies appear; and the latter occur in somewhat random 
fashion. There also may be loss of speed because of structural inertia. 
Perhaps catalysts do not generate response until they are re-defined 
with respect to fixed ends. In pure form, administrative rationality 
arguably threatens the unit. Although more speculative, effectiveness 
seems nicely wedded with substantive rationality because of higher 
sensitivity to catalysts for change. The flexibility that is implied 
seems the perfect antidote to unbridled concerns with efficiency. But 
in its pure form, the unit arguably lapses into incoherence with 
substantive rationality.
A balance of administrative and substantive rationality seems the 
best of all possible worlds. Efficiency as well as effectiveness are 
enhanced and there is less trade-off between them. The quest for such a 
balance is a venerable nostrum in the management sciences. But as this 
theory and research shows, there are costs. In pure form, a balance of 
administrative and substantive rationality points to a complete 
transformation--and possibly the demise of the unit. But in that 
transformation or demise there is continuity between the old and the
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new. Research on routine contexts suggests that administrative 
rationality prevails until such time as a crisis can no longer be 
overlooked (Starbuck, 1983). Research on disaster contexts--where 
crises are focused--suggests that the balance between administrative and 
substantive rationality is fleeting. The paradox of organization in 
either context is its strength and flimsiness (Collins, 1985). Studies 
of its basic processes brings this out.
There is an important lesson for applied management strategies. 
Restructuring cannot be forced into particular forms or patterns. It is 
a part of a process that has a natural momentum of its own: one that
can be explained; but one that is difficult to predict or control. 
Previous research has shown repeatedly that rapid prosocial action is 
characteristic of disaster (Quarantelli and Dynes, 1977; Kreps, 1984). 
What may appear as social disruption is better termed elemental forms of 
organizing to meet unusual demands. Thus emergency management planning 
must aim for flexibility. Trying to place restructuring within the 
confines of too rigid limits may well sacrifice efficiency and 
effectiveness, and lead to failure.
On the theoretical side, the dialectic of action and order is 
revealed by what Durkheim might call the becoming of organization.
Thus, substantive rationality prevails in the context of established 
means. Administrative rationality prevails in the context of emergent 
ends. The actor is both object and subject of structure. The unit is 
both constraining thing and constructed process. The theoretical goal 
is to make this dialectic fundamental to both description and 
explanation of structure. To do so requires an appeal to both
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qualitative content and quantitative form of human events. Such a goal 
is not newly stated here. What is newly stated is an explicit 
theoretical framework and research strategy for studying structure and 
process at the same time. Kreps (1985) earlier provided a theoretical 
framework. This thesis provides a research strategy for putting it to 
work.
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ENDNOTES
1) The distinction between types of rationality informs traditional 
concerns in the management sciences about efficiency and effectiveness 
(e.g., Starbuck, 1983). A preoccupation with administrative rationality 
suggests that things get done more efficiently. Yet, overemphasizing 
the means of accomplishing defined ends might undermine the unit because 
of too rigid adherence to domains and tasks as inflexible givens. On 
the other hand, preoccupation with substantive rationality increases the 
chance of effective performance if there is a consensus among those who 
are enacting organization. However, when effectiveness becomes the sole 
focus of participants, domains and tasks are constantly being assessed 
and reassessed to the detriment of the unit. Thus as Kreps (1985b) 
suggests, the trade-off between efficiency and effectiveness must not be 
allowed to become a zero sum game.
2) The nomenclature of time and space developed here revises somewhat 
Wallace's (1983) earlier distinctions in order to enhance clarity in 
presentation of findings from this study. There is no question, 
however, that his time and space measures are well-represented in the 
research.
3) For a more detailed description of that program see Taylor, Ross, and 
Quarantelli, 1976.
4) Maybe an important exception here is that D-T-R-A forms tend to take 
longer than the remaining 4-element forms of restructuring (mean of 13.7 
days for 7 D-T-R-A forms and 6.2 days for 5 remaining 4-element forms). 
The latter forms evidence a greater balancing of substantive and 
administrative rationality. In the absence of disaster experience-- and 
in the face of a need for a complete restructuring--perhaps there are 
modest costs in time with pure forms of substantive rationality. Note 
also that there is one case of a sequence of two restructurings where 
both are D-T-R-A (unit 14 on Table 6). The pattern here is one of both 
rhythm and some periodicity.
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APPENDIX
CODE BOOK
ITEM: Variable label COLUMNS
Case indentification: CASEID 3 (1-3)
2 (4-5)
1 (6)
Event number: EVENTN
Event type: EVENTTP
1 = earthquake
2 = tornado
3 = flood
4 = hurricane
Type of enacting organization:
ORG-TYP 1 (7)
1 *= emergency relevant public bureaucracy
2 = other public bureaucracy
3 = emergency relevant volunteer agency
4 = special interest group
5 = private firms
6 = emergent groups of individuals
7 = emergent groups of other groups
and organizations
8 = local military
9 = religious group
0 = uncertain
Description:________________________________
Organization activity type:
ACTN 2 (8-9)
1 = hazard-vulnerability analysis
2 = maintenance of standby human and
material resources
3 = disaster preparedness, planning,
and training
4 = public education
5 = hazard mitigation-structural
6 = hazard mitigation- nonstructural
7 = insurance
8 *= issuance of predictions and
warnings
9 >= dissemination of predictions and
warnings
10 = evacuation
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11 <= mobilization of emergency personnel
12 = protective action
13 = search and rescue
14 = medical care
15 = providing victim basic needs
(problems in living)
16 = damage and needs assessments and
inventory of available resources
17 = damage control
18 = restoration of essential public
services
19 = public information
20 = traffic control
21 = law enforcement
22 = local governance
23 = coordination and control (organization
of emergency personnel and resources)
24 * reconstruction of physical structures
25 = re-establishment of production,
distribution, and consumption activities 
(economic functioning)
26 = resumption of other social institutions
27 = determination of responsibility and
legal liability for the event
28 = meeting victim basic needs
29 = other
99 = uncertain
Description:________________________________
Specialized domain type: SD0M1 2 (10-11)
1 — public education
2 = mental health delivery
service
3 «= medical health care
4 = alcohol abuse services
5 = drug abuse services
6 = state hospital aftercare
programs
7 *= day care service programs
8 = religious health care
programs
9 «= child guidance center
10 = suicide crisis center
11 = institutional advocacy
services
12 = state and county
hospitals
13 = head start programs
14 = churches
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15 = health and welfare
agencies
16 = senior citizens groups
17 = other
99 = uncertain 
Tasks description:__________________
Resources description:
Activities description:
Domain implicated: DPMI
1 = yes
2 = no
9 = uncertain
Description:___________
Tasks implicated: TASI
1 = yes
2 = no
9 = uncertain
Description____________
Resources implicated: RESI
1 «= yes
2 = no
9 «= uncertain
Description:_______________
1 (12)
1 (13)
(14)
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Activities implicated: ACTI
1 = yes
2 = no
9 = uncertain
Description:________________
Elapsed time from initiation to 
restructuring of element 1: ETR-E1 
number of days-hours 
88888 = non-used element 
99999 = uncertain 
Description:__________________________
Elapsed time of restructuring from element 
1 to element 2: ETR-E2
number of days-hours 
88888 = non-used element 
99999 = uncertain 
Description:________________________________
Elapsed time of restructuring from element 
2 to element 3: ETR-E3
number of days-hours 
88888 = non-used element 
99999 = uncertain 
Description:________________________________
Elapsed time of restructuring from element 
3 to element 4: ETR-E4
number of days-hours 
88888 = non-used element 
99999 = uncertain 
Description:________________________________
1 (15)
5 (16-20)
5 (21-25)
5 (26-30)
5 (31-35)
74
Total time of restructuring El to end: 
TOT-RES
number of days-hours 
88888 = non-used 
99999 = uncertain 
Description:___________________________
Form of restructuring: 
FOR-RES
1 = d
2 = t
3 = r
4 = a
5 = dt
6 - dr
7 = da
8 - td
9 = tr
10 = ta
11 - rd
12 « rt
13 = ra
14 = ad
15 = at
16 = ar
17 = dat
18 = dar
19 = dtr
20 - dta
21 drt
22 = dra
23 = trd
24 = tra
25 = tda
26 = tdr
27 = tar
28 = tad
29 = rda
30 = rdt
31 = rat
32 = rad
33 = rtd
34 - rta
35 = atr
36 = atd
37 = art
38 = ard
39 = adr
40 = adt
5 (36-40)
2 (41-42)
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41 = dtra
42 = dtar
43 = drat
44 = drta
45 = datr
46 = dart
47 = trad
48 = trda
49 = tadr
50 = tard
51 = tdra
52 = tdar
53 = radt
54 = ratd
55 = rdta
56 - rdat
57 = rtda
58 = rtad
59 = adtr
60 = adrt
61 - atdr
62 — atrd
63 = ardt
64 = artd
Description:
Number of social links during
restructuring: SOC-LK 2 (43-44)
number of links 
99 *= uncertain 
Description:________________________________
Number of social linkages - local:
LLINKS 2 (45-46)
number of links 
99 = uncertain 
Description:________________________________
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Number of social linkages - county:
CLINKS 2 (47-48)
number of links 
99 = uncertain 
Description:________________________________
Number of social linkages - state:
SLINKS 2 (49-50)
number of links 
99 = uncertain 
Description:_______________________________
Number of social l i n k a g e s  - national:
NLINKS 1 (51)
number of links 
9 = uncertain 
Description:________________________________
Size of organization: ORGSZ (52)
1 = 9 or less members
2 =10-20 members
3 =21-50 members
4 = 51-100 members
5 = 101 or more members
9 = uncertain
Description:________________________________
Number of subunits in predisaster
organization: PRE-SUB 2 (53-54)
number of subunits 
99 = uncertain
Description:________________________________
Number of ranks in formal hierarchy:
NUM-RKS 1
1 = 3 or fewer ranks in authority
structure
2 = 4 or more ranks in authority
structure
3 = not applicable 
9 = uncertain
Description:________________________________
Unit task structure:
UNT-STR 2 (56
number of tasks 
99 «= uncertain 
Description:________________________________
Unit proximity to impacted area:
UNT-PRO
1 = local
2 = county
3 = state
4 «= national
5 = not relevent - emergent unit
9 = uncertain
Description________________________________
Locus of pre-disaster activities: LOC-PDA 1
1 = local
2 = county
3 = state
4 = national
5 = not relevent - emergent unit
9 «= uncertain
Description:________________________________
(55)
-57)
(58)
(59)
Extent of unit disaster experience:
UNT-EXP 1 (60)
1 = no experience
2 = limited experience
3 = moderate experience
4 = extensive experience
9 = uncertain
Description:_______________________________
Unit pre-planning: UNT-PLN 1 (61)
1 = written program - regularly
updated
2 = written plan - filed
3 = no written plan
9 = uncertain
Description:________________________________
Dispersion of focal unit activities-
pre-disaster: DIS-PRE 1 (62)
1 = concentrated in one area
2 = 2 to 4 areas
3 = 5 or more areas
9 >= uncertain
Description:________________________________
Dispersion of focal unit activities-
post-disaster: DIS-POS 1 (63)
1 = concentrated in one area
2 = 2 to 4 areas
3 = 5 or more areas
9 = uncertain
Description:_______________________________
Initiation of unit disaster response:
UNT-IDR 1 (64)
1 =* self-contained
2 = boundary spanning local
3 = boundary spanning state
4 *= boundary spanning national
5 «= boundary spanning (mixed state
and local)
6 = boundary spanning ( mixed local
and national)
7 = boundary spanning (mixed state
and national)
8 = boundary spanning ( mixed local,
state, and national)
9 = uncertain
Description:________________________________
Focus of domain 
at restructuring: DIS-LOC
1 *= municipality proper
2 = county proper
3 = mixed municipality and
county 
9 = uncertain
Description:________________________
Reason for suspension of disaster relevent 
activity: REA-SUS
1 = demand met, activities terminated
2 = loss or depletion of human or material
resources
3 = absorbtion of domain and tasks by
another entity
4 = task structure breaks down
9 = uncertain
Description_________________________________
Total time of disaster response: TTRES 
number of days-hours 
88888 = non-used 
99999 = uncertain
Description:
Response continuing at point of final
interview: RES-CON
1 = yes
2 = no
9 = uncertain
Description:___________
Restructuring beneficial to focal unit 
RES-BEN
1 = yes
2 = no
9 = uncertain
Description:
Restructuring related to focal units 
specialized domain: RES-REL
1 = related
2 = unrelated
3 = partially related 
9 = uncertain
Description:_________________________
Unit identification: UN1D 2 (75
1 — Health Foundation
2 = County United Health Foundation
3 = Child Counseling Center
4 = Metropolitan Hospital
5 = Drug Encounter Group
6 = County Mental Health Clinic
7 *= Board of Education
8 = Community Mental Health Group
9 = County Welfare Department
10 = Local Church
11 = Public School
12 = Multiple County Mental Health
Association
(72)
(73)
(74)
-76)
81
13 = Children's Head Start Program
14 = County Health Department
15 = County Hospital
16 = County Mental Health Group
17 = Multi-faith Church Group
18 = Adult-Child Guidance Center
19 = County Health Commission
20 = County Health And Welfare
Planning Council
21 = College Health Care Center,
22 = Children's Service Group
23 = Community Mental Health Center
24 = Religious Social Services
Group
25 = Family Mental Health Unit
26 = County Mental Health
Association
27 = County Hospital
28 — Senior Citizens Group
29 = County Welfare Department
30 = Senior Citizens Council
31 = State Hospital
32 = Counseling-Intervention Unit
33 = County Mental Health Board
34 = Local Inter-Church Group
35 = Disaster Outreach Group 
40 = Other
Description:________________________________
Elements symmetrically related: ELE-SYM 2 (77)
1 = No - one element form
2 = Yes - two element symmetrical
3 = No - two element non-symmetrical
4 = No - three element non-tendency
5 = Yes - symmetrical tendency
6 = Yes - four element symmetrical
7 = No - four element non-symmetrical 
9 = Uncertain
Description:________________________________
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Logical metric - weighted first element:
BMET 2 (78-79)
1 - -5
2 = -4
3 - -3
4 = -2
5 - -1 
6 = 0
7 = +1
8 = +2 
9 = +3
10 = +4
11 = +5
Description:_______________________________
Logical metric - non weighted first element:
JMET (80)
1 =  -2 
2 =  -1 
3 = 0
4 = +1
5 = +2
Description:_______________________________
Logical metric - origins:
GMET 1 (81)
1 = -3
2 =  -2 
3 = -1 
4 = 0
5 = +1
6 = +2  
7 = +3
Description:_________
Conflict within focal unit: 
CONFIN
0 = benign
1 = conflictual 
9 = uncertain
Description:_______________
Conflict outside focal unit: 
CONFOUT
0 = benign
1 = conflictual 
9 = uncertain
Description:________________
Total time of focal units involvment 
in disaster related activities: TTINVO 
number of days-hours 
88888 = non-used 
99999 = uncertain 
Description:____________________________
Agent for restructuring of focal unit: 
AGENT
1 = internal
2 = external 
9 = uncertain
Description:___________________________
Source for restructuring: SOURCE
1 = collective
2 = individual 
9 = uncertain
Description:_____________________
1 (82)
(83)
5 (84-85)
1 ( 86)
1 ( 87)
84
Derived logical metric: METRIC 2 (88-89)
1 = -7
2 -6
3 = -5
4 = -4
5 = -3
6 = -2
7 = -1
8 = 0
9 = +1
10 = +2
11 = +3
12 = +4
13 = +5
14 - +6
15 = +7
Description:
Catalyst for restructuring: CATA 1 ( 90)
1 = element related contingency
2 = disaster event
3 = competition
4 = cooperation 
9 = uncetain
Description:________________________________
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